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Surveillance for Waterborne Disease
Outbreaks—United States, 1991–1992
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Summary
Problem/Condition: Since 1971, CDC and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
have maintained a collaborative surveillance program for collection and periodic re-
porting of data on the occurrence and causes of waterborne disease outbreaks.
Reporting Period Covered: January 1991 through December 1992.
Description of System: The surveillance system includes data about outbreaks associ-
ated with water intended for drinking and also about those associated with
recreational water. State and local public health departments are the agencies with
primary responsibility for the detection and investigation of outbreaks. State and ter-
ritorial health departments report these outbreaks to CDC on a standard form.
Results: For the 2-year period 1991–1992, 17 states and territories reported 34 out-
breaks associated with water intended for drinking. The outbreaks caused an
estimated 17,464 persons to become ill. A protozoal parasite (Giardia lamblia  or
Cryptosporidium ) was identified as the etiologic agent for seven of the 11 outbreaks
for which an agent was determined. Five (71%) of the outbreaks caused by protozoa
were associated with a surface-influenced groundwater source. One outbreak of cryp-
tosporidiosis was associated with filtered and chlorinated surface water. Shigella
sonnei  and hepatitis A virus were implicated in one outbreak each; both were linked
to consumption of contaminated well water. Two outbreaks due to acute chemical poi-
soning were reported; one had an associated fatality. No etiology was established for
23 (68%) of the 34 outbreaks, including the largest one reported during this period, in
which an estimated 9,847 persons using a filtered surface water supply developed
gastroenteritis. Most (76%) of the 34 outbreaks were associated with a well water
source.
Twenty-one states reported 39 outbreaks associated with recreational water, in
which an estimated 1,825 persons became ill. The most frequently reported illness
was hot tub- or whirlpool-associated Pseudomonas  dermatitis (12 outbreaks). Of 11
outbreaks of swimming-associated gastroenteritis, six were caused by Giardia  or
1Parasitic Diseases Branch, Division of Parasitic Diseases, National Center
for Infectious Diseases (NCID), CDC
2Global Consulting for Environmental Health, Radford, VA
3Health Studies Division, Health Effects Research Laboratory, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency
4Water Quality Laboratory, Scientific Resources Program, NCID, CDC
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Cryptosporidium, including three outbreaks associated with chlorinated, filtered pool
water. The first reported outbreak of Escherichia coli  O157:H7 infection associated
with recreational exposure occurred during this period. Primary amebic menin-
goencephalitis, caused by Naegleria fowleri  infection, resulted in six deaths.
Interpretation: The number of waterborne disease outbreaks reported per year has
not changed substantially in the past 5 years. However, etiologic agents only recently
associated with waterborne disease, such as E. coli  O157:H7 and Cryptosporidium,
are being reported more frequently and from new settings. Water quality data for out-
breaks during the period 1991–1992 indicate that available water disinfection
technology is not always in place or used reliably. However, the high percentage of
outbreaks attributed to relatively chlorine-resistant protozoa suggests that improve-
ments in monitoring and treatment of potable water may be needed.
Actions Taken: Surveillance data, which identify the types of water systems and their
deficiencies and the etiologic agents associated with outbreaks, are used to evaluate
the adequacy of current technologies for providing safe drinking and recreational
water, establish research priorities, and assist in improving water quality regulations.
INTRODUCTION
The reporting of waterborne disease outbreaks (WBDOs) is voluntary in the United
States. National statistics on outbreaks associated with water intended for drinking
have been available since 1920 (1 ). Since 1971, CDC and the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) have maintained a collaborative surveillance program with collection
and periodic reporting of data on the occurrence and causes of waterborne outbreaks
(2,3 ). This summary includes data for 1991 and 1992 and for previously unreported
outbreaks in 1988 and 1989.
The surveillance program includes data for outbreaks associated with water in-
tended for drinking and with recreational water. Previous summaries have reported
data for foodborne outbreaks of gastroenteritis on oceangoing passenger vessels that
call on U.S. ports. Because these data are not related to the goals of the surveillance
program, they will no longer be included in these summaries.
CDC and EPA activities related to waterborne disease surveillance have the follow-
ing goals: a) to characterize the epidemiology of waterborne diseases; b) to identify
deficiencies in water systems and the etiologic agents causing outbreaks; c) to train
public health personnel in investigating WBDOs; and d) to collaborate with local, state,
and other federal and international agencies on initiatives to prevent waterborne dis-
ease. The data gathered through surveillance are useful for evaluating the adequacy
of current treatment technologies for providing safe drinking and recreational water.
Surveillance information influences research priorities and may lead to improved
water quality regulations.
State health departments can request epidemiologic assistance from CDC in the
investigation of WBDOs. In addition, CDC and EPA can be consulted about the engi-
neering and environmental aspects of water treatment and about collecting
large-volume water samples to identify pathogenic bacteria, viruses, or parasites.
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EPA REGULATIONS FOR WATER INTENDED FOR DRINKING
Public water systems are regulated under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SWDA)
(PL 93-523) of 1974. The microbial content of drinking water is regulated by EPA
through the Total Coliform Rule (54 FR 27544-27568) and the Surface Water Treatment
Requirements (SWTR) (54 FR 27486-27541). A maximum contaminant level for total
coliforms specifies the percentage of samples that may contain any coliforms during
a month. The turbidity of finished water must meet specified maximum and monthly
standards. All public systems using surface water or groundwater under the direct
influence of surface water must provide disinfection. Systems must also filter the
water unless they meet specific conditions, including source water quality criteria for
turbidity and total or fecal coliforms and a watershed control program to minimize
potential contamination by human enteric viruses and Giardia  cysts. EPA is consider-
ing a groundwater disinfection rule and revisions to the SWTR.
METHODS
Sources of Data
State and local public health agencies are primarily responsible for the detection
and investigation of disease outbreaks. State health departments voluntarily report
WBDOs to CDC on a standard form (CDC form 52.12, Rev. 02-91). In December 1991
and 1992, CDC personnel sent requests for reports to the state and territorial epidemi-
ologists or to persons designated as coordinators of WBDO surveillance. Personnel in
states that did not respond to the letters were contacted by telephone. In addition,
personnel from the EPA Health Effects Research Laboratory contacted state water sup-
ply agencies to obtain information about WBDOs.
Definition of Terms
The surveillance system for WBDOs differs from other systems in that the unit of
analysis is an outbreak rather than an individual case of a particular disease. Two cri-
teria must be met for an event to be defined as a WBDO. First, at least two persons
must have experienced a similar illness after ingestion of water intended for drinking
or after exposure to water used for recreational purposes. Second, epidemiologic evi-
dence must implicate water as the source of the illness. The stipulation that at least
two persons be ill is waived for single cases of laboratory-confirmed primary amebic
meningoencephalitis and for single cases of chemical poisoning (if water quality data
indicate contamination by the chemical). If primary and secondary cases are distin-
guished on the outbreak report form, only primary cases are included in the case
counts.
Community and noncommunity public water systems are regulated under the
SDWA. Community water systems  are defined as public or investor-owned systems
that serve large or small communities, subdivisions, or mobile-home parks with at
least 15 service connections or 25 year-round residents. Noncommunity water sys-
tems  serve institutions, industries, camps, parks, hotels, or businesses that may be
used by the general public. Of the approximately 200,000 water systems in the U.S.
classified as public, 30% (60,000) are community water systems and 70% (140,000) are
noncommunity systems. Community water systems serve 91% of the U.S. population;
the remaining 9% are served by nonpublic or individual systems, usually wells or
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springs, used by one or several residences or by persons traveling outside populated
areas.
Deficiencies in water systems are classified as follows:
1 = untreated surface water (e.g., from rivers, lakes, or reservoirs);
2 = untreated groundwater (e.g., from wells or springs);
3 = treatment deficiency (e.g., temporary interruption of disinfection, chronically
inadequate disinfection, filtration absent or inadequate);
4 = distribution system deficiency (e.g., a cross-connection, back siphonage,
contamination of water mains during construction or repair, or contamina-
tion of a storage facility); and
5 = unknown or miscellaneous deficiency.
If more than one deficiency was reported for an outbreak, only the most important
is noted in the line listings. Outbreaks due to contamination of water or ice at the point
of use (e.g., a contaminated serving container) are not included in the line listings.
Recreational waters are categorized as freshwater swimming pools, whirlpools,
and naturally occurring fresh and marine surface waters. Although the surveillance
system includes whirlpool- and hot tub-associated outbreaks of dermatitis due to
Pseudomonas, it does not include wound infections caused by waterborne organisms,
such as Aeromonas  species.
Classification of Outbreaks
In this surveillance system, outbreaks are classified according to the strength of the
evidence implicating water (Table 1). Each outbreak, except single cases of illness re-
sulting from chemical poisoning and primary amebic meningoencephalitis, is
classified (I through IV) based on the epidemiologic data and the presence or absence
of water quality data on the report form. Epidemiologic data are weighted more heav-
ily than water quality data. Thus, in this summary, some outbreaks without water
quality data were included, but reports without supporting epidemiologic data were
omitted. The classification numbers are included in the line listings to indicate what
data were available. Classification numbers of II-IV do not necessarily imply that the
investigations were flawed; the circumstances of each outbreak differ, and not all out-
breaks can or should be rigorously investigated. A classification of I means that both
epidemiologic and water quality data were reported but does not necessarily imply
that the investigation was optimal.
RESULTS
Outbreaks Associated with Water Intended for Drinking
For the 2-year period 1991–1992, 17 states and territories reported 34 outbreaks
associated with water intended for drinking. The outbreaks caused illness in an esti-
mated 17,464 persons. Twenty-three outbreak reports (68%) were classified as Class I
(i.e., adequate epidemiologic and water quality data were provided). Outbreaks are
listed individually by state (Tables 2 and 3) and are tabulated by etiologic agent and
type of water system (Table 4) and by water system deficiency (Table 5).
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Fifteen outbreaks were reported for 1991 and 19 for 1992. No outbreaks were re-
ported for the months of October, November, or December. The month with the most
outbreaks (nine) was June (Figure 1). The median outbreak size was 57 persons
(range, 1–9,847). Twelve (35%) of the outbreaks were reported from Pennsylvania.
Thirty-one (91%) of the outbreaks caused gastroenteritis. The other waterborne ill-
nesses were chemical poisoning (two outbreaks) and hepatitis (one outbreak). Of the
estimated 17,464 persons reported ill, 40 persons were hospitalized and one died. Of
the hospitalized persons, 29 had acute gastrointestinal illness of unknown etiology
(AGI), four had cryptosporidiosis, three had hepatitis A infection, two had giardiasis,
one had nitrate intoxication, and one had fluoride intoxication. The reported death
occurred after fluoride poisoning.
Etiologic Agents
A protozoal parasite (Giardia lamblia  or Cryptosporidium ) was identified as the
causative agent in seven outbreaks, representing 21% of the 34 outbreaks and 64% of
the 11 WBDOs for which an etiology was determined. The four outbreaks of giardiasis,
which affected an estimated 123 persons, were reported from California, Idaho, Ne-
vada, and Pennsylvania. The outbreaks occurred in March (two), July (one), and
September (one). Two were associated with community water systems and two with
noncommunity systems. In the Nevada outbreak, the community was supplied by un-
filtered surface water that contained low levels of Giardia  cysts; however, neither
source nor tap water had detectable coliforms present. Chlorination of finished water
had not been maintained consistently in this system. The other three giardiasis
outbreaks were associated with groundwater supplies. In one of these, a cross-con-
nection resulted in contaminated surface water entering a system using a spring
water source. In another, coliforms were present in a water sample, but the source of
TABLE 1. Classification of investigations of waterborne disease outbreaks
Class* Epidemiologic data   Water quality data     
I ADEQUATE:†
(A) data were provided about exposed
and unexposed persons; and (B) the
relative risk or odds ratio was ≥2 or the
p-value was ≤0.05.
PROVIDED AND ADEQUATE:
could be historical information or
laboratory data. Examples: the history
that a chlorinator malfunctioned or a
water main broke; no detectable free
chlorine residual; the presence of
coliforms in the water.
II ADEQUATE. NOT PROVIDED OR INADEQUATE.
Example: stating that a lake was
crowded. 
III PROVIDED, BUT LIMITED:
(A) epidemiologic data were provided
that did not meet the criteria for Class I;
or (B) the claim was made that ill
persons had no exposures in common
besides water, but no data were
provided.
PROVIDED AND ADEQUATE.
IV PROVIDED, BUT LIMITED. NOT PROVIDED OR INADEQUATE.
*Classification was based on the epidemiologic and water quality data that were provided on
the outbreak report form.
†Adequate to implicate water.
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contamination of either the well or the underground storage tanks was not deter-
mined. No deficiency was identified in the remaining outbreak, which was associated
with a chlorinated well water source. In this outbreak, consumption of well water was
implicated epidemiologically; untreated water analyzed 3 months after the outbreak
did not contain coliforms.
Three outbreaks of cryptosporidiosis, which resulted in illness in an estimated
3,551 persons, occurred in Oregon (two) and Pennsylvania (one). They began in Feb-
ruary, May, and August, respectively. Although the two Oregon outbreaks occurred in
geographically adjacent locations and may have overlapped in time, epidemiologic
evidence suggests they were separate outbreaks. Because of some overlap in the af-
fected populations, case counts for the two outbreaks (Table 3) have been added
together.
Two distinct water supplies were implicated in the Oregon outbreaks. The first out-
break was associated with a disinfected spring water source that supplied a
community of 80,000 people. Low numbers of Cryptosporidium  oocysts were found
in water samples obtained over a 2-week period, but none were found in numerous
samples collected for 10 weeks thereafter. Sporadic low levels of coliforms, algae, and
diatoms suggested that the spring may have been influenced by surface water.
The other Oregon outbreak was associated with inadequate filtration of a river
water source. The river received waste water discharges, and water quality had dete-
riorated because of low stream flow during dry weather (4 ). The presence of
Cryptosporidium  oocysts in the filtered water was not confirmed. However, a reliable
examination was not possible because the filtered water contained an excessive num-
ber of oocyst-sized particles (e.g., algae). The turbidity of the filtered effluent water
was elevated; however, mean levels did not exceed the limits of the EPA SWTR. For
both Oregon outbreaks, a review of water quality records showed that each system
TABLE 2. Outbreaks associated with water intended for drinking — United States, 1991
(N=15)*




system** Deficiency†† Source Setting
CA Jul  I     Giardia   15   NC 4  spring recreation area
IL May  II     AGI  386   NC 5  well school
MI Jun  I     AGI 1,320   NC 2  well campground
MI Aug  I     AGI   33   NC 2  well resort
MN Jun  I     AGI   30   NC 2  well campground
MN Jul  I     AGI   30   NC 4  well resort
MN Aug  I     AGI   17   NC 2  well restaurant
NM Aug  I     AGI   38   NC 2  well camp
PA Jun  I     AGI  170   NC 3  well picnic area
PA Jul  I     AGI    8   NC 3  well restaurant
PA Sept III     Giardia   13   NC 3  well park
PA Aug  I     Cryptosporidium  551   NC 3  well picnic area
PA Jun  I     AGI  300   NC 3  well camp
PR Aug  I     AGI  202   Com 4  river penitentiary
PR Aug  I     AGI 9,847   Com 3  river community
 *See Methods section for description of reporting variables.
†Includes territories.
§See Table 1 for class definitions.
¶AGI=acute gastrointestinal illness of unknown etiology.
**NC=noncommunity; Com=community.
††See Methods section for definitions of deficiencies.
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had consistently met the coliform and turbidity maximum contaminant level (MCL)
over the past several years.
The third outbreak of cryptosporidiosis was associated with a noncommunity well
water source. Detection of coccidian oocysts that were the size and shape of
Cryptosporidium, algae, and diatoms indicated that the well was influenced by surface
water. Finished water in all three outbreaks was free of coliforms, and chlorine levels
were probably sufficient to inactivate bacteria but not Cryptosporidium  oocysts,
which are highly chlorine resistant.
Nonparasitic infectious etiologies were identified for only two outbreaks. One, a
WBDO caused by Shigella sonnei , which resulted in illness in an estimated 150 per-
sons, occurred in a park in which an untreated spring-water source was contaminated
with surface water. Shigella  was demonstrated both in water samples and in stool
specimens. An outbreak of serologically confirmed hepatitis A infection, associated
with an untreated well water supply (individual household), was the only outbreak in
which a viral pathogen was identified.
Two outbreaks due to acute chemical intoxication were reported. A case of
methemoglobinemia (5 ) was due to ingestion of infant formula diluted with water
that contained elevated levels of nitrate and copper. The water was from a shallow
well that supplied an individual household equipped with a reverse-osmosis mem-
brane filter. The filter reduced elevated nitrate-nitrogen levels in well water (58 mg/L)
to a concentration in tap water (9.9 mg/L) that was close to the MCL. A large outbreak
of acute fluoride poisoning caused illness in 262 persons and one fatality. Symptoms
included nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, abdominal pain, numbness, and tingling. Serum
chemistry abnormalities, including elevated lactic acid dehydrogenase and phospho-
rus levels and low magnesium levels, persisted for at least a week in some ill persons.
TABLE 3. Outbreaks associated with water intended for drinking — United States, 1992
(N=19)*




system¶ Deficiency Source Setting 
AK May  I  Fluoride** 262  Com 3  well community
ID Mar III  Giardia  15  Com 2  well trailer park
MN Feb  I  AGI 250  NC 3  lake restaurant
NV Mar  I  Giardia  80  Com 3  lake community
NY Apr III  AGI 107  NC 4  well restaurant
NC Jan  I  AGI 200  NC 2  well restaurant
OH Jun III  AGI 129  NC 4  well campground
OR Feb  I  Cryptosporidium ††  Com 3  spring community
OR May  I  Cryptosporidium ††  Com 3  river community
PA Mar III  AGI   5  NC 3  well restaurant
PA May  II  AGI  28  Com 5  river park
PA Jun III  AGI  38  Ind 2  well private home
PA Jun III  AGI  42  NC 3  well camp
PA May  I  AGI  50  NC 3  well camp
PA May III  AGI  57  NC 3  well camp
PA Aug  I  AGI  80  NC 3  well camp
WA Jun  I  Hepatitis A  10  Ind 2  well private home
WI Jun  I  Nitrate   1  Ind 3  well farm
WY Jul  I  Shigella sonnei 150  NC 2  well park
 *See Methods section for description of reporting variables.
†See Table 1 for class definitions.
§AGI=acute gastrointestinal illness of unknown etiology.
¶NC=noncommunity; Com=community; Ind=individual.
**Resulted in one death.
††Total estimated number of cases for the Oregon outbreaks was 3,000; see text.
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The outbreak was attributed to improperly installed equipment and to inadequate
monitoring of the community water system, which resulted in fluoride levels in the
water that were 12-fold higher than recommended.
In 23 WBDOs (68%), no etiologic agent was identified. Fourteen of these outbreaks
of AGI included cases in which the symptom complex, incubation period, and duration
of illness were consistent with a viral syndrome. In 15 of the outbreaks of AGI, stool
specimens were negative for bacterial pathogens. Stool specimens were examined
for ova and parasites in three investigations and for viral pathogens in only one.
Coliforms were found in water samples for 19 (83%) of the AGI outbreaks, and chlori-
nation deficiencies were associated with two others. In the largest AGI outbreak, an
estimated 9,847 persons in Puerto Rico became ill when the water system resumed
operation after an interruption due to drought. Waste water discharges into the river
water source, temporary lack of chlorination, filtration deficiencies, and insufficient
flushing of old water from pipes and tanks were identified as possible factors contrib-
uting to the outbreak.
Water Quality Data
Water quality data were obtained within 1 month of the WBDO for 30 (94%) of the
32 outbreaks that had a known or suspected infectious etiology. For all 30 of these
WBDOs, water was tested for coliforms; in five outbreaks, samples were also exam-
ined for protozoa. Coliforms were noted for 24 outbreaks (80%). Overall, for outbreaks
with bacterial, viral, or unknown etiologies, coliform testing was positive in 21 (88%).
However, for protozoal outbreaks, finished water collected within a month of the out-
break contained coliforms in only two (33%) of six. Water was shown to contain the
etiologic agent for four outbreaks: Shigella  (one), Giardia  (two), and Cryptosporidium
(one).
Water Supply
Twenty-three (68%) of the 34 WBDOs were associated with noncommunity systems
and only eight (24%) with community systems, but the outbreaks in community sys-
tems resulted in 77% of the total cases (Table 4, Figure 2). Outbreaks in community
TABLE 4. Outbreaks associated with water intended for drinking, by etiologic agent
and type of water system — United States, 1991–1992 (N=34)
Agent†
Type of water system*
TotalCommunity Noncommunity Individual
Outbreaks Cases Outbreaks Cases Outbreaks Cases Outbreaks Cases
AGI   3 10,077  19  3,252  1  38   23 13,367
Giardia   2     95   2     28  0   0    4    123
Cryptosporidium   2  3,000   1    551  0   0    3  3,551
Hepatitis A   0      0   0      0  1  10    1     10
Shigella sonnei   0      0   1    150  0   0    1    150
Nitrate   0      0   0      0  1   1    1      1
Fluoride   1    262   0      0  0   0    1    262
Total   8 13,434  23  3,981  3  49   34 17,464
(Percent§) (24) (    77) (68) (  23) (9) (<1) (100) (  100)
*See Methods section for description of types of water systems.
†AGI=acute gastrointestinal illness of unknown etiology.
§The percentage of 34 outbreaks or of 17,464 cases.
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systems were primarily associated with surface water sources (63%). In contrast, only
4% of noncommunity outbreaks were associated with surface water.
Of the 34 outbreaks, 26 (76%) occurred in systems using well water. In 12 (46%) of
the 26, the water was untreated. Inadequate or interrupted disinfection was the defi-
ciency identified in another 12 (46%). Ten of these systems used chlorine disinfection;
two systems used ultraviolet (UV) light. Of the remaining two outbreaks associated
with treated well-water systems, one was attributed to a cross-connection with an
unapproved supplemental pond water source, and no deficiency was reported for the
other.
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FIGURE 1. Waterborne outbreaks, by month — United States, 1991–1992
TABLE 5. Outbreaks associated with water intended for drinking, by type of deficiency
and type of water system — United States, 1991–1992 (N=34)
Type of deficiency
Type of water system
TotalCommunity Noncommunity Individual
No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%)
Untreated surface water 0 (  0)  0 (  0) 0 (  0)  0 (  0)
Untreated groundwater 1 ( 13)  7 ( 30) 2 ( 67) 10 ( 29)
Treatment 5 ( 63) 11 ( 48) 1 ( 33) 17 ( 50)
Distribution system 1 ( 13)  4 ( 17) 0 (  0)  5 ( 15)
Unknown 1 ( 13)  1 (  4) 0 (  0)  2 (  6)
Total 8 (100) 23 (100) 3 (100) 34 (100)
Vol. 42 / No. SS-5 MMWR 9
Water Source
In six (18%) of the 34 outbreaks, the water source was a lake or river (surface water).
All systems provided chlorination, and four also provided filtration. In the filtered sys-
tems, distribution deficiencies were found for one outbreak, no deficiency was
identified for one, and the other two were associated with poor filtration of water.
During one of these latter outbreaks, the water was also temporarily not chlorinated.
One of the unfiltered systems was preparing for an exemption from the filtration re-
quired by EPA’s Surface Water Treatment Rule, and its raw water quality had been
excellent (low turbidity, no coliforms) before the outbreak.
Two outbreaks (6%) were associated with spring water. A giardiasis outbreak oc-
curred when a cross-connection at the water storage tanks allowed contaminated
surface water to enter the distribution system. For the other outbreak, which was due
to Cryptosporidium, evidence (i.e., presence of algae and diatoms) suggested that sur-
face water had entered the spring water.
Outbreaks attributed to water contaminated at the point of use rather than at its
source or in its distribution traditionally are not included in the line listings. CDC re-
ceived five reports of such outbreaks, which caused an estimated 593 persons to
become ill, including three who were hospitalized. Four of the five were outbreaks of





























*See Methods section for description of reporting variables.
FIGURE 2. Outbreaks associated with water intended for drinking — United States,
1991–1992 (N=34)*
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outbreak). The other was an outbreak caused by Norwalk virus, which apparently con-
taminated an ice machine aboard an oceangoing passenger ship.
Outbreaks Associated with Recreational Water
For the period 1991–1992, 21 states reported a total of 39 outbreaks associated with
water used for recreation (Tables 6 and 7). Thirty-three outbreaks were reported for
1991 and six for 1992. Two of the 21 states submitted 13 of the 39 reports: Washington
(seven) and Minnesota (six). Outbreaks were reported for each month except April
and November, but most outbreaks occurred in June (nine) or July (eight) (Figure 1).
The outbreaks caused illness in an estimated 1,825 persons. Median outbreak size
was seven persons (range, 1–595). Reported illnesses included dermatitis (15 out-
breaks), gastroenteritis (11), meningoencephalitis (six), Pontiac fever (four),
conjunctivitis with otitis or pharyngitis (two), and leptospirosis (one). Twenty-one per-
sons reportedly were hospitalized. The six deaths associated with recreational water
exposure were all due to amebic meningoencephalitis.
Of the 15 outbreaks of dermatitis, which affected an estimated 292 persons,
12 (80%) were outbreaks of rash or folliculitis associated with hot tubs, whirlpools, or
swimming pools. In eight of the 12, Pseudomonas  was confirmed as the etiologic
agent, and in the other four, the clinical syndrome was consistent with this etiology. In
seven of the investigations, water sampling demonstrated low chlorine
concentrations or the presence of Pseudomonas, or both. In the three dermatitis out-
breaks not associated with Pseudomonas, a clinical syndrome consistent with
schistosomal dermatitis (swimmer’s itch) was noted. Two of these outbreaks were as-
sociated with swimming in lakes in Utah and Wyoming. The third was associated with
ocean water in Delaware; local snails were found to contain cercariae of Austrobilhar-
zia variglandis, an avian schistosome implicated as a cause of cercarial dermatitis (6 ).
The etiologic agent identified in six (55%) of the 11 outbreaks of gastroenteritis
(Table 7, Figure 3) was a protozoal parasite, either Giardia  (four) or Cryptosporidium
(two). Three Giardia  outbreaks were related to unintentional ingestion of untreated
water from a lake (one) or small wading pools (two). The other three parasitic out-
breaks were associated with community pools that were chlorinated and filtered. No
treatment deficiencies in the pools were identified. In five of the parasitic outbreaks,
no water sampling for protozoa was done. In the other, examination of filter backwash
from the pool 3 months after the outbreak did not reveal an etiologic agent.
Two outbreaks of gastroenteritis of unknown etiology were reported. Three other
outbreaks of gastroenteritis were attributed to bacterial pathogens; each outbreak was
associated with swimming in a lake. S. sonnei  was implicated for all three outbreaks.
In one of the three, Escherichia coli  O157:H7 was also implicated. This was the first
reported outbreak of E. coli  O157:H7 linked to recreational water. Bacterial subtyping
indicated that lake-associated transmission of both pathogens continued for 3 weeks
(personal communication, W. Keene). Poor water exchange was a contributing factor
in at least two of the three outbreaks, and, for both of these, fecal coliforms in shallow
lake water exceeded recommended state levels by several-fold.
Four outbreaks of hot tub- or whirlpool-associated Pontiac fever were reported. In
three of the four, serologically confirmed Legionella  infection was documented (7 ).
For the other, although the clinical syndrome was consistent with Pontiac fever, sero-
logic results were negative.
Vol. 42 / No. SS-5 MMWR 11
Two outbreaks of conjunctivitis were reported. Adenovirus serotype 3 was impli-
cated (from clinical and water samples) in an outbreak of conjunctivitis, pharyngitis,
and fever. Over a 2-month period, an estimated 595 persons became ill after swim-
ming in an inadequately chlorinated pond (8 ). A swimming-pool-associated outbreak
of conjunctivitis, otitis, and rash was caused by Pseudomonas.
An outbreak of leptospirosis was associated with swimming in a rural pond that
was stagnant because of drought (9 ). Leptospira interrogans  serovar grippotyphosa 
was demonstrated in urine specimens from patients and also from pond water; this
was the first reported investigation in which the organism was cultured from both
clinical and environmental samples.
The six cases of fatal primary amebic meningoencephalitis occurred during the
summer and fall of 1991 (10,11 ). Naegleria  was demonstrated in brain autopsy speci-
mens from five cases and in cerebrospinal fluid from the sixth. Cases were associated
with swimming in a lake (two), pond (one), or stream (one), or with facial immersion
in a puddle during a fight (one). Another was related to bathing in a hot spring that had
been associated with two previous cases (10 ).
Previously Unreported Outbreaks
Reports of three previously unpublished outbreaks from 1988 through 1989 were
received (Table 8). The etiologic agent for all three was S. sonnei. In the two associated
with water intended for drinking, an estimated 141 persons were reported ill and
13 were hospitalized. Both outbreaks occurred in noncommunity well-water systems.
Although each system was equipped for chlorination and one also had filtration and
UV capabilities, the equipment was not being used appropriately. In the WBDO asso-
ciated with recreational water, an estimated 61 persons were ill and six hospitalized
after swimming in a lake in which an ill child had defecated.
TABLE 6. Outbreaks of dermatitis associated with recreational water — United States,
1991–1992 (N=15)
State Year Month Class* Etiologic agent† 
No.
cases Source Setting
DE 1991 Oct  I c/w Schistosoma sp. 30 ocean beach
MN 1991 Feb Pseudomonas  7 hot tub private home
MN 1992 Sept Pseudomonas 29 swimming pool school
UT 1991 Jun IV c/w Schistosoma sp.  5 lake swimming area
WA 1991 Jun Pseudomonas  8 hot tub private home
WA 1991 Dec Pseudomonas  5 hot tub apartment spa
WA 1991 Oct c/w Pseudomonas  5 hot tub private home
WA 1991 Sept c/w Pseudomonas  2 hot tub private home
WA 1991 Jul c/w Pseudomonas  3 hot tub private home
WA 1991 Feb Pseudomonas  6 hot tub private home
WI 1991 Jun Pseudomonas  8 hot tub private home
WI 1991 Mar c/w Pseudomonas 45 whirlpool motel
WI 1991 Feb Pseudomonas 24 whirlpool motel
WI 1992 Feb Pseudomonas 10 whirlpool motel
WY 1991 Jun IV c/w Schistosoma sp.  5 lake park
*See Table 1 for class definitions.
†c/w=consistent with.
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TABLE 7. Other outbreaks associated with recreational water — United States, 1991–1992 (N=24)
State* Year Month Class† Illness Etiologic Agent§ No. cases Source Setting
CA 1991 Oct meningoencephalitis Naegleria¶   1 hot spring recreation area
FL 1991 Aug meningoencephalitis Naegleria¶   1 puddle rural area
GA 1991 Jul   I gastroenteritis Giardia   9 wading pool day care center
GA 1991 Jul  II gastroenteritis Giardia   7 wading pool day care center
GU 1991 Sept meningoencephalitis Naegleria¶   1 stream rural area
ID 1992 Aug  II gastroenteritis Cryptosporidium  26 water slide park
IL 1991 Jul   I leptospirosis Leptospira   6 pond rural area
MD 1991 Jun  II gastroenteritis Giardia  14 swimming pool park
MD 1992 Jul III gastroenteritis AGI  15 creek private home
MN 1992 Jan  I otitis, conjunctivitis, and rash Pseudomonas  35 swimming pool hotel
MO 1991 Aug  II gastroenteritis AGI  61 dunking booth fair
MT 1991 Mar  II Pontiac fever Legionella   4 hot tub ski resort
NC 1991 Jun   I pharyngitis adenovirus 3 595 pond camp
NC 1991 Sept meningoencephalitis Naegleria¶   1 pond swimming area
NC 1991 Sept meningoencephalitis Naegleria¶   1 lake swimming area
OR 1991 Jul   I gastroenteritis E. coli O157:H7**  80 lake park
OR 1992 Jun  II gastroenteritis Cryptosporidium 500 wave pool park
PA 1991 Jun   I gastroenteritis Shigella sonnei 203 lake park
RI 1991 Jul  IV gastroenteritis Shigella sonnei  23 lake swimming area
TX 1991 Jul meningoencephalitis Naegleria¶   1 lake swimming area
VT 1991 Jan   II Pontiac fever Legionella   6 hot tub ski resort
WA 1991 Jul  IV gastroenteritis Giardia   4 lake campground
WI 1991 May   I Pontiac fever Legionella   6 whirlpool motel
WI 1991 Mar   II Pontiac fever unknown  33 whirlpool motel
 *Includes territories.
† See Table 1 for class definitions.
§ AGI=acute gastrointestinal illness of unknown etiology.
¶ Resulted in one death.
**Mixed outbreak of Escherichia coli  O157:H7 and Shigella sonnei.
DISCUSSION
General Interpretation of Surveillance Data for Waterborne Disease
Outbreaks
The data in this surveillance summary should be interpreted with care. They prob-
ably do not reflect the true incidence of WBDOs or the relative incidence of outbreaks
caused by various etiologies. Only a fraction of WBDOs may be recognized, investi-
gated, and/or reported to CDC or EPA, and the extent of underrecognition and
underreporting is unknown.
The likelihood that individual cases of illness will be epidemiologically linked and
associated with water varies considerably among locales and is dependent on factors
such as consumer awareness, physician interest, and surveillance activities of state
and local health and environmental agencies. Therefore, the states with the most out-
break reports are not necessarily the ones with the most outbreaks. Recognition of
WBDOs is dependent on certain outbreak characteristics; outbreaks involving serious
illness are most likely to come to the attention of health authorities. In cities, large
outbreaks are more likely to be recognized than sporadic cases or small outbreaks in
which ill persons may consult different physicians. Outbreaks occurring in community
water systems are more likely to be recognized than those in noncommunity systems
because the latter serve nonresidential areas and transient populations. Outbreaks in
individual systems are the most likely to be underreported because they generally
involve small numbers of persons. Outbreaks of acute disease are more readily
Etiology Type of Exposure
Giardia lamblia





















*AGI=acute gastrointestinal illness of unknown etiology.
FIGURE 3. Outbreaks of gastroenteritis associated with recreational water use —
United States, 1991–1992 (N=11)
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identified than those associated with disease from chronic, low-level exposure to a
pathogen or chemical.
Identification of the etiologic agent of a WBDO is dependent on timely outbreak
recognition so that appropriate clinical and environmental samples can be obtained.
The interests and expertise of the investigators and the routine practices of local labo-
ratories also influence whether the causative agent is identified. For example,
diarrheal stool specimens generally are examined for bacterial pathogens but not vi-
ruses. In most laboratories, routine stool examination for ova and parasites does not
include the special procedures needed to identify Cryptosporidium. Water quality data
are also highly variable and depend on factors such as the health department’s fiscal,
investigative, and laboratory resources. Furthermore, a few large outbreaks may sub-
stantially alter the relative proportion of cases of waterborne disease attributed to a
particular agent. The number of reported cases is generally an approximate figure,
and the method and accuracy of the approximation vary among outbreaks.
1991–1992 Outbreaks Associated with Water Intended for Drinking
The total numbers of outbreaks reported for 1991 and 1992 are comparable with
those reported for recent years: 15 and 19, respectively. With the addition of pre-
viously unreported outbreaks, 16 WBDOs have been reported for 1988, 13 for 1989,
and 14 for 1990 (2,3 ). WBDO reports peaked during 1979–1983 (Figures 4 and 5); the
increase and the subsequent decrease in reports may reflect, at least in part, changes
in surveillance activity rather than deterioration or improvement in water systems
(12 ).
During the years 1971–1990, comparable proportions of WBDOs were associated
with noncommunity (45%) and community systems (43%) (2,3,13 ). However, during
1991–1992, substantially more noncommunity than community outbreaks (68% ver-
sus 24%) were reported. Although these data may not indicate a new trend, they may
reflect increased public usage of noncommunity systems in recreational areas; June
and July were the months with the most noncommunity outbreaks. Outbreaks in non-
community systems were more likely than those in community systems to be
associated with untreated water (44% versus 13%).
Protozoal parasites were the most frequently identified etiologic agents. From 1978
through 1991, Giardia  was the most commonly implicated pathogen (2 ). However, in
1992, the same numbers of outbreaks of giardiasis and cryptosporidiosis were
TABLE 8. Waterborne outbreaks not included in previous summaries — United States,
1988–1989 (N=3)*
A. Outbreaks associated with water intended for drinking.




system§ Deficiency Source Setting
IL 1988 Jul I Shigella sonnei  11 NC 5 well restaurant
PA 1989 Apr I Shigella sonnei 130 NC 3 well restaurant
B. Outbreaks associated with recreational water.
State Year Month Class† Illness Etiologic agent
No.
cases Source Setting
IL 1988 Jun I gastroenteritis Shigella sonnei 61 lake beach club
*See Methods section for description of reporting variables.
†See Table 1 for class definitions.
§NC=noncommunity.
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reported. The increased identification of cryptosporidiosis may be due to heightened
awareness that the organism may cause WBDOs (14–16 ). However, outbreaks caused
by Cryptosporidium  are probably still underrecognized. An important factor in the
recognition of the outbreaks in 1992 was routine screening of stool specimens for
Cryptosporidium  by certain local laboratories, which is not standard practice in most
areas. The continued importance of waterborne cryptosporidiosis was recently under-
scored by an outbreak in Milwaukee (in March and April of 1993) that was the largest
WBDO ever reported in the United States; an estimated 403,000 persons had watery
diarrhea (personal communication, JP Davis). Cryptosporidium  oocysts are wide-
spread in U.S. raw water sources in both pristine and polluted areas (17 ). Water
analysis at 66 U.S. and Canadian surface water treatment plants has revealed low lev-
els of Cryptosporidium  oocysts in up to 27% of drinking water samples (18 ), but the
methods used do not assess viability or potential infectivity of the cysts. The risk
posed by these low levels of oocysts for immunocompetent and immunocom-
promised persons is unknown. In the Oregon outbreak in February 1992, oocyst levels
in environmental samples were low, and the attack rate (<5%) was also lower than the
attack rates reported for Cryptosporidium  outbreaks in which oocyst levels in water
samples were more than 10-fold higher (14 ). More information is needed about the
infective dose, the differences in virulence among strains, and whether acquired im-
munity is protective and long lasting.
























AGI=acute gastrointestinal illness of unknown etiology.
FIGURE 4. Waterborne outbreaks, by year and etiologic agent — United States,
1971–1992 (N=609)
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Two outbreaks caused by acute chemical intoxication were reported. Methemoglo-
binemia has been previously documented after ingestion of water contaminated with
nitrates, often from agricultural fertilizers (19 ). The EPA has established an MCL of 10
mg/L for nitrate-nitrogen, but the regulation applies only to public water systems. In
this report, the reverse-osmosis filter reduced nitrate levels only to the MCL (5 ). Ele-
vated copper levels in the water may have contributed to the development of
methemoglobinemia by inducing emesis in exposed ill persons, resulting in elevation
of gastric pH with subsequent growth of nitrate-reducing bacteria and increased ni-
trate-to-nitrite conversion in the stomach. The 1992 outbreak of acute fluoride
intoxication is the largest reported to date, and clinical follow-up of ill persons showed
that metabolic abnormalities and elevated urine and/or serum fluoride levels can per-
sist for a week or more.
As in previous years (Figure 4), the majority of outbreaks (68%) during 1991–1992
were classified as AGI of unknown etiology. Although some outbreaks were rigorously
investigated, for many of these, the search for a causative agent was limited or clinical
specimens could not be or were not obtained in a timely manner. The likelihood of
identifying an etiologic agent was equally low (approximately one-third) for surface
water and groundwater sources. However, the agent was much more frequently iden-
tified for WBDOs in community systems (63%) than in noncommunity systems (17%),






















*See Methods section for description of types of water systems.
FIGURE 5. Waterborne outbreaks, by year and type of water system — United States,
1971–1992 (N=609)*
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emphasizing the difficulty of investigating outbreaks affecting the transient popula-
tions that use noncommunity water. Although the clinical features of illness in more
than half of the AGI outbreaks suggest a viral etiology, clinical diagnosis is not spe-
cific; the group of outbreaks of AGI probably includes viral, bacterial, and parasitic
etiologies. Availability of rapid diagnostic tests for viruses and newly emerging patho-
gens can aid in identifying the causative agents of these outbreaks. Information about
the pathogens responsible for WBDOs is important for evaluating the adequacy of
current water treatment processes and regulations. Nevertheless, the water quality
data from AGI outbreaks suggest that available water disinfection technology is not
always in place or used reliably; for 91% of these outbreaks, water sampling showed
the presence of coliforms and/or deficiencies in chlorination.
During 1991–1992, 24 outbreaks (71%) were associated with contaminated un-
treated or inadequately treated groundwater. Adequate, continuous disinfection of
groundwater should reduce the occurrence of WBDOs, particularly in small systems in
which intermittent contamination of wells and springs is difficult to detect or prevent.
In addition, wells and springs must be protected from sources of contamination such
as surface runoff, septic tank drainage, and sewage discharges.
Two outbreaks were associated with treatment deficiencies in water systems using
UV light for disinfection. UV light can be an effective disinfectant if properly applied,
operated, and maintained. It may be effective for disinfecting bacteria and viruses but
not protozoa (20,21 ). Reduced efficacy of UV systems for colored or turbid water has
been noted (22 ), and UV light is not approved by EPA for use in surface water systems
or in groundwater systems under the influence of surface water. For many of the out-
breaks associated with inadequately treated water, chlorination was not maintained
consistently. Adequate, consistent levels of chlorine are particularly important for
disinfection of relatively chlorine-resistant organisms such as Giardia  (23 ). Unfortu-
nately, Cryptosporidium  is highly resistant to disinfection by chlorine. Ozone is more
effective than chlorine against Cryptosporidium  (24 ), but no residual disinfectant is
provided with this treatment. Ozone may not be suitable for small systems because of
expense and the technical expertise required, and it is used as a disinfectant by <1% of
the drinking water systems that serve populations of more than 10,000. Therefore,
efforts to reduce the risk of waterborne giardiasis and cryptosporidiosis should focus
on source protection and removal of cysts and oocysts by filtration.
The SWTR requires filtration of all but exceptionally well-protected surface water
sources, including groundwater influenced by surface water. The SWTR was promul-
gated to reduce the risk of disease caused by waterborne protozoal parasites. Three
protozoal outbreaks during 1991–1992 occurred in systems that were equipped with
chlorine disinfection and met EPA coliform standards but were not equipped with fil-
tration. EPA is considering an Information Collection Rule (ICR) that would require
larger water utilities to monitor for Cryptosporidium, Giardia, and perhaps other
pathogens in source water and, under certain conditions, in treated water for
18 months. Under the ICR, careful laboratory analysis and quality control would be
needed, and the currently available laboratory methods do not assess infectivity of
cysts or oocysts. Epidemiologic studies in conjunction with information on the occur-
rence of cysts and oocysts in source water will be helpful in assessing waterborne
disease risks, determining the need for an enhanced Surface Water Treatment Rule,
and determining whether specific monitoring for protozoal pathogens is necessary to
supplement the total coliform MCL. The water quality data collected for WBDOs in the
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years 1991–1992 indicated that coliforms were detected for 88% of the outbreaks with
bacterial, viral, or unknown etiologies but only 33% of the protozoal outbreaks. These
data suggest that the use of coliforms as indicators of water contamination is gener-
ally sound but may not be adequate to detect contamination by protozoa.
Four of the six surface water systems associated with WBDOs were equipped with
filtration. In three of these outbreaks, raw water quality had deteriorated because of
sewage effluents that were not appropriately diluted as a result of low stream flows
during dry weather. During the outbreaks associated with these systems, filtration de-
ficiencies were noted, with elevated turbidity in finished water. Decreased filtration
efficiency combined with deterioration in raw water quality also contributed to the
WBDO in Milwaukee (1993). Although turbidity measurements indicated inefficient
operation of the filtration process for the water systems associated with the 1993 Mil-
waukee outbreak and one Oregon outbreak (May 1992), none of the then-existing EPA
water quality regulations were violated. Outbreaks associated with filtered systems
illustrate the importance of improved operation and monitoring of the filtration proc-
ess and the necessity for multiple barriers; in addition to disinfection and filtration,
protection of raw water quality is essential for preventing transmission of waterborne
diseases.
1991–1992 Outbreaks Associated with Recreational Water Use
In the period 1991–1992, the most frequently reported WBDOs due to recreational
water were outbreaks of dermatitis associated with hot tubs, whirlpools, and swim-
ming pools. Although factors such as host susceptibility, immersion time, and number
of bathers can influence acquisition of infection (25 ), in general, most outbreaks are
directly related to inadequate operation and maintenance procedures. Outbreaks are
preventable if water is maintained at a pH of 7.2–7.8 with free residual chlorine levels
from 2 to 5 mg/L, as specified in CDC’s guidelines for public spas and hot tubs (26 ).
Pontiac fever due to aerosolized Legionella pneumophila  is also associated with use
of hot tubs and whirlpools (27,28 ).
The six deaths associated with recreational water were caused by primary amebic
meningoencephalitis (PAM). The presence in fresh water of the etiologic agent,
Naegleria fowleri, is related to water temperature. Cases of PAM in the United States
are rare but generally have been acquired during summer months when exposure to
warm water is highest (29 ). Although behavioral risk factors for PAM are unknown,
three cases in 1991 occurred in persons who may have had an increased risk of inhal-
ing water; two were in young children learning to swim and the third in a young man
whose face was immersed during a fight.
Swimming and other recreational activities in which unintentional ingestion of
water can occur are known to increase the risk of gastrointestinal illness, even in
non-outbreak settings (30,31 ). The number of outbreaks of gastroenteritis due to in-
advertent ingestion of water during swimming (Figure 3) was similar to the number
previously reported (11 in 1991–1992 compared with 13 in 1989–1990). However, in
contrast to past years, approximately half (55%) of the gastroenteritis outbreaks were
attributed to protozoal parasites: Giardia  (four) and Cryptosporidium  (two). Crypto-
sporidiosis associated with recreational water has been previously reported (32 ) but
probably is underrecognized. The two cryptosporidiosis outbreaks were identified be-
cause drinking water outbreaks of Cryptosporidium  in the region earlier in the year
had led to increased awareness of the need to consider this diagnosis. Three of the
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outbreaks of protozoal gastroenteritis occurred in pools that were chlorinated and fil-
tered; two were in settings (wave pool or water slide) with an increased risk of
unintentional ingestion of water. Typical pool chlorination will disinfect Giardia  cysts
but may require more than 15 minutes, depending on temperature, pH, and chlorine
concentration. Even though Cryptosporidium  oocysts are resistant to disinfection by
chlorine, they can be removed by most pool filtration systems. However, rates of filtra-
tion are generally slow, requiring up to 6 hours for a complete turnover of pool water.
Therefore, water treatment does not ensure protection against protozoal infection in
these settings.
Outbreaks of swimming-associated shigellosis, which have been documented pre-
viously (2,33,34 ), continue to be reported. The probable source of the pathogen in the
three 1991–1992 outbreaks, as in past outbreaks, was fecal contamination of lake
water by other swimmers. A contributing factor in at least two of the outbreaks may
have been poor water exchange in the swimming area. In one outbreak, a history of
having swallowed lake water was a risk factor for illness. Because the infectious dose
of Shigella is low, infection may be acquired without swallowing large quantities of
water (35 ). An outbreak of E. coli  O157:H7 infection occurred in conjunction with one
of the Shigella  outbreaks. This is the first reported E. coli  O157:H7 outbreak associ-
ated with recreational water exposure. This outbreak was recognized rapidly because
E. coli O157:H7 infection had been made reportable by the state during the previous
year. E. coli O157:H7, like Shigella, appears to have a low infectious dose (36 ). Further-
more, it can survive in water under certain conditions for long periods; in one study,
only a 2-log reduction in bacterial counts was found to have occurred after 5 weeks at
5 C (37 ). The long period of transmission in this outbreak may have been due to rein-
troduction of the particular E. coli  O157:H7 subtype into the swimming area, but it is
more likely that it persisted in lake water for the duration of the outbreak.
The EPA has published criteria for evaluating the quality of fresh and marine recrea-
tional waters (38,39 ). Microbial monitoring has been recommended for recreational
areas potentially contaminated by sewage. However, the value of routine monitoring
of untreated water for fecal contamination due to bathers has not been established.
Prevention efforts have focused on providing adequate toilet facilities at recreational
areas and limiting the density of bathers.
CONCLUSION
Information from national WBDO surveillance is used to characterize the
epidemiology of waterborne diseases in the United States. Data regarding the types of
water systems and deficiencies associated with outbreaks are necessary to evaluate
the adequacy of treatment regulations and current water quality monitoring. Identifi-
cation of the etiologic agents of outbreaks is particularly critical because agents newly
associated with waterborne outbreaks may require new methods of control. In recent
years, Cryptosporidium  and E. coli  O157:H7 have been identified as important water-
borne pathogens. Rapid recognition and control of several outbreaks in 1991–1992
were aided by surveillance for these agents at the local and state level. Maintaining
the capabilities of local and state health departments to investigate outbreaks and to
conduct surveillance is a key factor in waterborne disease control and prevention. In
addition to outbreak investigation, epidemiologic studies are needed to evaluate the
risk of waterborne disease; evidence suggests that a substantial proportion of
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non-outbreak-related diarrheal illness may be associated with consumption of water
that meets all current water quality standards (40 ).
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Summary
Problem/Condition: Improved surveillance for silicosis is needed to target interven-
tions to prevent this occupational lung disease caused by the inhalation of crystalline
silica dust.
Reporting Period Covered: 1987–1990.
Description of Systems: State-based silicosis surveillance and intervention programs
have been developed in Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, and Wisconsin as part of the
Sentinel Event Notification System for Occupational Risks (SENSOR) Program, initi-
ated in 1987 by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH).
Results: From 1987 through 1990, the SENSOR program confirmed a total of 430 cases
of silicosis reported from these four states. Overall, approximately 60% of these cases
were in workers employed in primary metal industries, although the types of indus-
tries in which cases occurred varied by state. Some cases were attributable to
relatively recent exposure, including new cases in seven persons first exposed since
1980 in New Jersey. Silicosis case reports have prompted measurement of respirable
silica concentrations at 25 Michigan work sites, and 14 (56%) of these sites were found
to have levels that exceeded the legally permissible exposure level.
1Michigan State University, Lansing, MI.
2Michigan Department of Public Health, Lansing, MI.
3New Jersey Department of Health, Trenton, NJ.
4Ohio Department of Health and Social Services, Columbus, OH.
5Wisconsin Department of Health, Madison, WI.
6Division of Respiratory Disease Studies
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), CDC
7Division of Surveillance, Hazard Evaluations, and Field Studies, NIOSH,
CDC
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Interpretation: The silicosis surveillance and intervention strategies piloted by state
health departments in the NIOSH-funded SENSOR Program have demonstrated the
feasibility and effectiveness of identifying specific silica-using work sites that need
preventive intervention.
Actions Taken: On the basis of initial experience in these four states, NIOSH developed
guidelines for state-based silicosis surveillance and awarded SENSOR cooperative
agreements to three additional states where the applicability of these surveillance
methods will be further evaluated.
INTRODUCTION
In 1987, 10 states were awarded 5-year cooperative agreements by CDC’s National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) to develop and implement sur-
veillance systems for selected occupational conditions under the Sentinel Event
Notification System for Occupational Risks (SENSOR) Program (1 ). The purpose of
the SENSOR Program is to develop and implement case-based surveillance and pre-
ventive follow-up activities for selected occupational diseases and injuries (1 ). One of
the diseases selected for SENSOR activities is silicosis, a fibrotic lung disease caused
by inhalation of respirable crystalline silica dust. Although some cases occur after only
a few years, most cases of silicosis occur after ≥20 years of occupational exposure.
This report summarizes data from silicosis surveillance in the Michigan, New Jersey,





All four states have relied, at least in part, on reporting of silicosis by physicians for
case ascertainment. In Ohio, physicians have been required by law to report this con-
dition since 1953, but not until 1989 were occupational disease reports actively
solicited. In Michigan, known or suspected work-related illnesses have been report-
able by health professionals since 1978, but active solicitation of reports did not begin
until 1988. In New Jersey, although physician reporting had been encouraged since
1983, mandated reporting by physicians did not begin until 1990. In Wisconsin, occu-
pational disease reporting continues to be voluntary.
Other means of case ascertainment have varied by state. New Jersey and Michigan
have complemented physician reports with cases identified by review of death certifi-
cates and hospital discharge data, as well as with selected follow-up investigations of
workplaces where workers with index cases had been exposed to silica. Hospital dis-
charge data account for three-fourths of all reports in each of these two states. In
addition, Michigan has reviewed records of workers’ compensation awards available
from the Michigan Department of Labor. Ohio relies entirely on physician reports, but
has actively solicited case reports from individual physicians of decedents identified
initially through review of death certificate data. Wisconsin has complemented
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physician reporting with ascertainment of cases through review of workers’ compen-
sation records, a procedure that accounts for half the confirmed cases in that state.
Case Confirmation
All four states collect demographic, work history, and medical information about
each reported silicosis case from a combination of the initial case ascertainment
source, review of medical records, and interview of cases and/or family members.
Case confirmation requires a) a history of occupational exposure to silica and a chest
radiograph classified by a “B” reader* as category 1/0 or greater profusion of small
rounded opacities or b) a lung tissue biopsy indicating silicosis (2 ).
Preventive Intervention
Follow-up and prevention efforts, which vary among the participating states, in-
clude some or all of the following activities: a) checking with employer or examining
other databases to determine if the workplace remains in operation; b) educational
outreach regarding the health hazards of silica exposure to workers with silicosis, em-
ployees, employers, and physicians; c) workplace evaluations, including review of
workplace industrial hygiene measurements and employee records, and silica air
monitoring by SENSOR or Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) in-
dustrial hygienists; and d) referral to appropriate regulatory agencies if excessive
exposures or hazardous work situations are found.
RESULTS
Epidemiology
From 1987 through 1990, the SENSOR program has confirmed a total of 430 cases
of silicosis (Tables 1 and 2). By state, the average year of first occupational exposure
to silica dust for workers with cases ranged from 1943 in Michigan to 1961 in Wiscon-
sin. However, in all three states collecting information on year of first exposure
(Michigan, New Jersey, and Wisconsin) there were workers with cases whose first
exposure was after 1969 (n=23). This total includes seven new cases in New Jersey
first exposed after 1980. The average duration of exposure for all confirmed cases was
26 years; 39 (10%) of confirmed cases had <10 years of occupational silica exposure,
and 106 (27%) had <20 years.
Overall, approximately 60% of the persons affected by silicosis worked in primary
metal industries (Table 2). This industry, which includes foundries, accounted for at
least 70% of the confirmed cases in Michigan and Wisconsin. Stone, clay, glass, and
concrete products (including ceramics) industries were the predominant source of ex-
posure among the New Jersey cases. In Ohio, no single industry was predominant.
Workplace Follow-up
Detailed information on follow-up efforts in Michigan are illustrative of the poten-
tial effectiveness of state-based preventive interventions. The 249 cases of silicosis in
*“B” readers are physicians certified by NIOSH as proficient in classifying chest radiographs
for pneumoconioses using the International Labour Office Classification for Radiographs of
Pneumoconioses (3 ).











TABLE 1. Case-ascertainment sources for confirmed silicosis cases — Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, and Wisconsin, Sentinel Events
Notification System for Occupational Risks (SENSOR) programs, 1987–1990
Source
Michigan New Jersey Ohio* Wisconsin Total
No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%)
Hospital discharge records 190 ( 76.3) 66 ( 74.2) —† — 256 ( 59.5)
Death certificates  25 ( 10.0)  1 (  1.1) —† —  26 (  6.0)
Worker’s compensation claims  17 (  6.8) — —† 25 ( 50.0)  42 (  9.8)
Physician  14 (  5.6)   3§ (  3.4) 42 (100.0) 23 ( 46.0)  82 ( 19.1)
Other   3 (  1.2) 19 ( 21.3) —†  2 (  4.0)  24 (  5.6)
Totals 249 (100.0) 89 (100.0) 42 (100.0) 50 (100.0) 430 (100.0)
*All cases in Ohio are reported by physicians, but some reports are actively solicited by the health department on the basis of death
certificate review.
†State does not use this data source for surveillance of silicosis cases.
§One of these three cases was also ascertained from hospital discharge data.
TABLE 2. Industry reported as source of silica exposure for silicosis cases — Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, and Wisconsin, Sentinel
Events Notification System for Occupational Risks (SENSOR) programs, 1987–1990
Industry (SIC* code)
Michigan New Jersey Ohio Wisconsin Total
No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%)
Manufacturing
Primary metal industries (33) 195 ( 78.3) 15 ( 16.9)  8 ( 19.0) 35 ( 70.0) 253 ( 58.8)
Stone, clay, glass, and
concrete products (32)  16 (  6.4) 44 ( 49.4)  9 ( 21.0)  1 (  2.0) 70 ( 16.3)
Miscellaneous
(22,26,27,28,30,34,35,36,37,38)  17 (  6.8) 12 ( 13.5) 10 ( 24.0)  6 ( 12.0) 45 ( 10.5)
Mining (10–14)  10 (  4.0)  9 ( 10.1)  1 (  2.4)  2 (  4.0) 22 (  5.1)
Construction (15–17)   4 (  1.6)  7 (  7.9)  0 —  0 — 11 (  2.6)
Transportation and communication
(42,46,47,48,49)   3 (  1.2)  1 (  1.1)  0 —  0 —  4 (  0.9)
Services (73,76,77,80)   1 (  0.4)  0 —  0 —  1 (  2.0)  2 (  0.5)
Trade (50,59)   0 —  1 (  1.1)  0 —  0 —  1 (  0.2)
Undetermined   3 (  1.2)  0 — 14 ( 33.3)  5 ( 10.0) 22 (  5.1)
Totals 249 (100.0) 89 (100.0) 42 (100.0) 50 (100.0) 430 (100.0)
*Standard industrial classification.
Michigan were associated with 144 silica-using workplaces. Sixty-one (42.4%) of these
workplaces were no longer operating at the time of follow-up, 19 (13.2%) were located
out of state, 11 (7.6%) no longer used silica, two (1.4%) involved multiple locations in
the building trade, and four (2.8%) were unknown. The remaining 47 workplaces were
targeted for follow-up inspection. Airborne silica concentrations measured at the first
25 worksites inspected exceeded the legally permissible exposure level at 14 (56%)
and the NIOSH-recommended exposure limit at 17 (68%).
DISCUSSION
Silicosis is a chronic, nonmalignant lung disease caused by the inhalation of
respirable crystalline silica dust. Despite longstanding knowledge about its cause, this
preventable occupational lung disease continues to account for more than 300 deaths
each year in the United States (4 ). Surveillance of silicosis has revealed neither the
true burden nor the continuing risk of the disease (5,6 ), and prevention of silicosis will
require improved surveillance in all 50 states (7 ). The findings in this report indicate
that the silicosis surveillance strategies piloted by state health departments in the
NIOSH-funded SENSOR Program are both feasible and useful. In these four states, the
SENSOR Program has identified both large numbers of silicosis cases and high-risk
workplaces and industries for targeting interventions and, by identifying cases result-
ing from relatively recent exposures, has clearly documented that silicosis is an
ongoing problem.
SENSOR silicosis surveillance has identified multiple complementary sources for
case ascertainment. Michigan and New Jersey have demonstrated that hospital dis-
charge data, while underestimating the total number of patients with silicosis (8 ), can
readily identify a considerable number of silicosis cases (9,10 ). Michigan, New Jersey,
and Ohio have demonstrated that review of death certificate data can identify addi-
tional cases of silicosis.
Mandated case reporting by physicians, although incomplete, appears to provide
the most timely case ascertainment, identifying more recently diagnosed cases. All
four states have conducted outreach to certain specialty groups, primarily pulmonolo-
gists and occupational medicine specialists, to increase physician reporting of silicosis
cases. Although Michigan and New Jersey have encouraged adoption of a national
system for reporting aggregated readings by NIOSH-certified “B” readers (11 ), Michi-
gan and Wisconsin have already begun providing pneumoconiosis classification of
chest radiographs by “B” readers free of charge to physicians, companies, and indi-
viduals in those states. The utility and success of these targeting efforts have not been
evaluated with regard to preventing silicosis and other pneumoconioses.
Although the surveillance data from each state tend to reflect the primary silica-
using industries of that state, the data also have served to identify less-recognized
occupational risks. For example, SENSOR surveillance has identified silicosis among
workers employed in the dental supplies industry, a group that is not generally recog-
nized as being at high risk for silicosis (12 ).
SENSOR data indicate that, despite a generally long latency period for this disease,
follow-up of silicosis cases can help public health authorities identify ongoing hazard-
ous exposures (10 ). The efficacy of such follow-up is illustrated by the findings of
inspections in Michigan. Moreover, all states have found that workplace follow-up of
a documented case often provides the employer particularly strong motivation to
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control exposures through primary prevention strategies, such as material substitu-
tion and engineering controls. Thus, the case-based approach complements the usual
industrywide approach to occupational hazard control (9 ).
The data initially reported to the SENSOR programs in Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio,
and Wisconsin suggest that the SENSOR methods for case-based silicosis surveil-
lance systems can be successfully implemented by state health departments,
particularly in those states with mandated reporting requirements and/or state access
to hospital discharge data (6 ). Based on the pioneering efforts of these four states,
NIOSH has developed guidelines for state-based silicosis surveillance. New SENSOR
cooperative agreements have been awarded to the four states that piloted these meth-
ods, as well as to three additional states—Illinois, North Carolina, and Texas—where
the methods will be field tested to ascertain their applicability beyond the four original
states. Based on the field-test results, a model surveillance system will be developed
for implementation in all states interested in the prevention of silicosis.
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Summary
Problem/Condition: Multiple-cause mortality data was assessed as a source of infor-
mation for surveillance of deaths associated with head or neck injuries.
Reporting Period Covered: 1985–1986
Description of System: Data on causes of death were abstracted from death certifi-
cates in New Mexico and coded according to criteria of the International Classification
of Diseases, Ninth Revision (ICD-9). Deaths with an external cause-of-death (E) code as
the underlying cause of death and one or more head or neck injury nature-of-condition
(N) codes as contributing causes of death were considered head or neck injury deaths.
These data were compared with data for head or neck injury deaths obtained from
computerized records from the New Mexico Office of the Medical Investigator (OMI).
Data for alcohol or drug use were abstracted from both systems.
Results: Of the 699 head or neck injury deaths coded by the New Mexico OMI system
in 1985–1986, 536 were identified as head or neck injury deaths in multiple-cause mor-
tality data (sensitivity = 76.7%). Firearms were the leading cause of head or neck injury
deaths, followed by motor vehicles. Multiple-cause mortality data contained alcohol
codes for only 3.7% of OMI records with blood alcohol concentrations ≥0.10 mg/dL
and contained drug codes for none of the OMI records with positive toxicology tests
for drugs.
Interpretation: The sensitivity of multiple-cause mortality data was relatively high for
surveillance of head and neck injury deaths. This information source may be useful for
conducting statewide surveillance for mortality from head injuries; however, the sen-
sitivity and positive predictive value of these data require further assessment.
Multiple-cause data substantially underestimate the extent of alcohol and drug in-
volvement for head or neck injury deaths.
1Division of Unintentional Injury Prevention, National Center for Injury
Prevention and Control
2Surveillance and Information Systems Section, Surveillance and Programs
Branch, Division of Environmental Hazards and Health Effects, National
Center for Environmental Health
3State Branch, Division of Field Epidemiology, Epidemiology Program Office
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Actions Taken: The findings in this investigation have prompted further assessment of
the usefulness of death certificate data for head injury surveillance.
INTRODUCTION
Although the incidence of head injuries has been estimated for local jurisdictions in
the United States (1–7 ), surveillance at the state and national levels is needed to
monitor such injuries and evaluate the impact of preventive measures. Some re-
searchers have suggested that CDC’s multiple-cause mortality data from death
certificates could be used for such surveillance because the data are readily available
and require no new collection system (8 ). Multiple-cause mortality data include un-
derlying cause of death and up to 20 associated medical conditions, such as type of
injury. Although no true standard exists for evaluating the validity of death certificate
diagnoses, a medical examiner system is probably the best standard available be-
cause the cause of death in cases investigated by medical examiners is subject to
more thorough investigation than are routine cases. Using 1985–1986 data from the
New Mexico Office of the Medical Investigator* (OMI) as the standard, we compared
the sensitivity of multiple-cause mortality data with data from deaths investigated by
the OMI for ascertaining deaths caused by head or neck injuries.
METHODS
In New Mexico, by law, the OMI investigates deaths occurring on nonfederal lands
that are of unknown cause or are sudden, violent, or untimely. (The OMI investigates
similar types of deaths on federal lands only when invited by federal authorities). The
chief medical investigator is a forensic pathologist who is responsible for appointing
judicial district medical investigators. All district medical investigators are physicians.
Computerized OMI records were reviewed for all injury deaths among U.S. resi-
dents occurring in New Mexico during the period 1985–1986. All records with codes
for subdural hematoma or head and neck injury were classified as head or neck injury
deaths. In addition, records that might have included head or neck injury (OMI records
coded as multiple injury, stab wound, gunshot wound, or child abuse) were reviewed
manually; these deaths were classified as resulting from head or neck injury if there
was any mention of injury to a head or neck anatomic structure. All head or neck injury
deaths were categorized by external cause: motor vehicle, intentional and uninten-
tional firearm discharge, fall, or other. Three injury epidemiologists reviewed and
classified 27 records for which it was unclear whether the deaths were attributable to
injury.
Head or neck injury deaths investigated by the OMI were classified as alcohol asso-
ciated if tests indicated that the decedent had a blood alcohol concentration (BAC)
≥0.10 mg/dL; for records with more than one BAC, the highest recorded level was used
for classification. Deaths were considered to be drug associated if toxicology tests
indicated the presence of any narcotic, barbiturate, analgesic, sedative, antidepres-
sant, stimulant, tranquilizer, cannabinoid, or other psychoactive substance.
*In New Mexico, medical examiners are known as medical investigators, and the state office
responsible for investigating deaths is the Office of the Medical Investigator.
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Using a broad definition for head or neck injury-associated deaths (Table 1), we
reviewed multiple-cause mortality tapes for deaths among U.S. residents who died in
New Mexico during the period 1985–1986. Multiple-cause mortality data are ab-
stracted from death certificates and coded onto tapes according to criteria of the
TABLE 1. International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision (ICD-9), nature of
condition (N) and external cause of death (E) codes used for multiple-cause mortality
definitions
Nature of condition (N) codes
Head injury               
800-804 Fracture of skull
830.0-830.1 Dislocation of jaw
850-854 Intracranial injury, excluding those with skull fracture
870-873 Open wound of ocular adnexa, eyeball, ear, other wound of head
905.0 Late effect of fracture of skull and face bones
907.0 Late effect of intracranial injury without mention of skull fracture
907.1 Late effects of injury to cranial nerve(s)
910 Superficial injury of face, neck, and scalp (except for eye)
918 Superficial injury of eye and adnexa
920 Contusion of face, scalp, and neck
921 Contusion of eye and adnexa
925.0 Crushing injury of face, scalp, and neck
950-951 Injury to optic nerve and pathways, injury to other cranial nerves
953.0 Injury to cervical nerve root
959.0 Injury, other and unspecified, to face and neck
Neck injury               
344.0 Quadriplegia
805.0-805.1 Fracture of cervical spine without mention of spinal cord injury
806.0-806.1 Fracture of cervical vertebral column with spinal cord injury
807.5-807.6 Fracture of larynx and trachea
839.0-839.1 Dislocation of cervical vertebra
847.0 Sprains and strains of neck
848.1-848.2 Sprains and strains of septal cartilage of nose, jaw, thyroid region
874 Open wound of neck
900 Injury to blood vessels of head and neck
905.1 Late effect of fracture of spine and trunk without mention of spinal cord injury
906.0 Late effect of open wound of head, neck, and trunk
907.2 Late effect of spinal cord injury
908.3 Late effect of injury to blood vessel of head, neck, and extremities
Alcohol use               
291 Alcoholic psychoses
303 Alcohol dependence syndrome
305.0 Alcohol abuse
790.3 Excessive blood level of alcohol
Drug use               
292 Drug psychoses
304 Drug dependence
305.2-305.9 Nondependent abuse of drugs 
965 Poisoning by analgesics, antipyretics, and antirheumatics
967 Poisoning by sedatives and hypnotics
968.5 Poisoning by surface and infiltration anesthetics
969 Poisoning by psychotropic agents
970.0 Poisoning by analeptics
977.0 Poisoning by other and unspecified medicinal substances: dietetics
External cause-of-death (E) codes
Motor vehicle: 810-825
Falls: 880–888
Firearms: 922.0-922.9, 955.0–955.4, 965.0–965.4, 970, 985.0–985.4
Other: 800-809, 826–879, 889–921, 923–954, 955.5–955.9, 956–964, 965.5–965.9,
966–969, 971–984, 985.5–985.9, 986–999
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International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision (ICD-9) (9 ). We included all
deaths with an external cause-of-death (E) code as the underlying cause and one or
more nature-of-condition (N) code for head or neck injury as a contributing cause
(Table 1). Categories for external cause were motor vehicle, unintentional or inten-
tional firearm discharge, fall, or other. Multiple-cause mortality head or neck injury
deaths were defined as alcohol or drug associated if certain codes were present
(Table 1).
To assess the sensitivity of multiple-cause mortality data for ascertaining head or
neck injury deaths, we matched OMI and multiple-cause mortality records involving
head or neck injuries by sex, race, age, and date of death. We included 30 records from
the OMI system that matched with a corresponding record from the vital records sys-
tem for each variable except age, after manual review showed matching birth dates
but different ages.
Multiple-cause mortality data contain information about county of death, but do
not indicate whether deaths occurred on federal or nonfederal land. (Federal lands are
present in the majority of New Mexico counties.) As a result, the specificity and posi-
tive predictive value of multiple-cause mortality data for head or neck injuries could
not be calculated.
RESULTS
Of 699 head or neck injury deaths included in the OMI system, 536 were also in
multiple-cause mortality data, for an overall sensitivity of 76.7%. The sensitivity was
highest for deaths coded for firearms and lowest for those coded for falls (Table 2).
Deaths in the OMI system not identified by multiple-cause mortality data were similar
by race and sex to those found in both systems, but differed significantly by age
(p<0.02) (Table 3).
Most head or neck injury deaths included in multiple-cause mortality data were
coded under five general rubrics (Table 4). Of the 536 deaths common to both sys-
tems, 486 (90.7%) were coded as due to intracranial injury (N850–N854) or open
wound of the eye, ear, or head (N870–N873). (The majority of the latter were coded as
N873.1—open wound of the scalp.) All 15 multiple-cause mortality records with neck
injury codes also had head injury codes.
OMI records indicated that 460 (85.8%) of 536 persons had been tested for the pres-
ence of alcohol or drugs, 168 (36.5%) of whom had positive tests. The sensitivity of
multiple-cause mortality data was 3.7% (5/134) for ascertaining deaths associated with
TABLE 2. Sensitivity of multiple-cause mortality data for identifying head or neck injury
deaths in the Office of the Medical Investigator (OMI) records, New Mexico, by external






Firearms 303 277 91.4%
Motor vehicle 247 172 69.6%
Other  96  63 65.6%
Fall  53  24 45.3%
Total 699 536 76.7%
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BACs ≥0.10 mg/dL and no evidence of drug use, 0% for 17 deaths associated with
drugs, and 0% for 17 deaths associated with both alcohol and drugs.
DISCUSSION
In the OMI system, head and neck injuries could not be separated. Because all
deaths with neck injury codes reported in multiple-cause mortality data also had head
injury codes, our study may be more representative of deaths resulting from head
rather than neck injury.
Multiple-cause mortality data had fairly high sensitivity for ascertaining deaths re-
ported in the OMI system that involved head or neck injury, especially for deaths
associated with firearms. However, multiple-cause mortality data were not useful for
identifying alcohol- and drug-associated deaths due to these injuries. Underreporting
of alcohol use on death certificates has been noted before (10 ), but the extent of un-
TABLE 3. Demographic characteristics of persons with head or neck injury deaths
identified in both the multiple-cause mortality and Office of the Medical Investigator
(OMI) systems, compared with persons with head or neck injury deaths identified only
by records — New Mexico, 1985–1986
Characteristic
Identified in both systems Identified only in OMI system
P-value*N (%) N (%)
Median age
(years)  30  35 0.02
Sex
 Male 417 (77.8) 121 (74.2)
 Female 119 (22.2)  42 (25.8) 0.40
Race
 White 471 (87.8) 138 (84.7)
 Black  10 ( 1.9)   2 ( 1.2) 0.35
 Other  55 (10.3)  23 (14.1)
*The Kruskal-Wallis and chi-square tests were used to compare a) median age and b) sex and
race distributions, respectively.
TABLE 4. ICD-9* Nature-of-condition codes for 536 persons with head or neck injuries
common to the multiple-cause mortality data and Office of the Medical Investigator
systems — New Mexico, 1985–1986
Cause



















(n=277) 1 ( 0.4)   4 ( 1.4) 276 (99.6) 0 ( 0.0)  0 ( 0.0)
Motor vehicle
(n=172) 4 ( 2.3) 169 (98.3)   0 ( 0.0) 1 ( 0.6) 10 ( 5.8)
Other (n=63) 4 ( 6.3)  52 (82.5)  15 (23.8) 0 ( 0.0)  3 ( 4.8)
Falls (n=24) 2 ( 8.3)  23 (95.8)   0 ( 0.0) 0 ( 0.0)  1 ( 4.2)
*International Classification of Diseases, 9th Revision.
†Numbers in parentheses are row percents and total more than 100 because some death
certificates had >1 nature-of-condition code; similarly, individual row numbers do not equal
row totals because multiple codes were assigned to one event.
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derreporting of alcohol use on death certificates with head or neck injury codes has
not been previously reported. Death certifiers should obtain drug and alcohol tests
and report the results on death certificates, even if delays in obtaining test results
make it necessary to file supplemental reports.
In contrast to previous findings (2,4–8 ), firearms were the leading cause of head
injury deaths. This finding underscores the importance of including open wounds of
the eye, ear, or head when these deaths are defined, since most head injury deaths
from firearms had one of those codes. In a study in which multiple-cause mortality
data were used without the category for open wound of the eye, ear, or head, 315,328
deaths from head injury were found in the United States from 1979 through 1986 (8 ).
When we reanalyzed the data and included these codes, we found an additional
102,404 deaths due to head injury, of which 97.0% contained an underlying cause of
death attributed to firearms (11 ). This finding may indicate that nosologists use codes
for open wounds to the eye, ear, or head inappropriately for head injury deaths, since
these codes should be used for wounds that were incidental to intracranial injury (9 ).
The ICD codes used by researchers to define head injury have varied widely
(3,5–8 ). Although we searched multiple-cause mortality records for a wide range of
ICD-9 codes corresponding to head injury, we found that >90% of deaths due to head
injury were coded as intracranial injury or open wound of the eye, ear, or head. Further
exploration is needed to determine the adequacy of a surveillance system for head
injury mortality that uses a simple case definition with these two categories.
Although multiple-cause mortality data underascertain head or neck injury deaths
from falls, our results demonstrate that death certificate data may be appropriate and
useful for monitoring head injury deaths. Determining the sensitivity and positive pre-
dictive value is needed in other localities so that the use of multiple-cause mortality
data as a surveillance system for mortality from head injury can be fully assessed. If
multiple-cause mortality data are found to have adequate sensitivity and positive pre-
dictive value, then, at a minimal cost, state health departments could use these data
for head injury mortality surveillance to monitor patterns, set priorities, and evaluate
the effects of efforts to prevent head injuries.
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